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STATE SCHOOL BOARD PRAYER RULED
UNCONSTITUTIONAL
.Engel v. Vitale
370 U.S. 421 (1962)
As a result of the "recommendation" of the State Board of Regents,
the district school principal, following the direction of the Board of Educa-
tion of Union Free School District No. 9, New Hyde Park, New York,
prescribed that each morning during opening exercises each class, in the
presence of a teacher, would recite a prayer. The prayer was short and non-
denominational: "Almighty God, we acknowledge our dependence upon thee,
and we beg thy blessings upon us, our parents, our teachers and our coun-
try." The prayer was voluntary in the sense that with parental endorsement,
a child would be allowed to refrain from participation or even to leave the
room if he so desired.
Several parents, finding the prayer repulsive to their beliefs, objected
to this imposition upon classroom activity. An action was brought to enjoin
the recitation of the prayer asserting that its imposition transgressed the
first amendment as applied to the states by the fourteenth amendment. The
language of the Constitution is: "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion. . . ." Plaintiff lost at three judicial levels in
the State of New York.' However, the Supreme Court of the United States
reversed the New York Court of Appeals, holding "that by using its public
school system to encourage recitation of the Regent's prayer, the State
of New York has adopted a practice wholly inconsistent with the establish-
ment clause."'2 The Court found that the prayer "is a religious activity...
a solemn avowal of divine faith and supplication for the blessings of the
Almighty."3 The Court further declared that the "establishment clause"
must at least mean "that in this country it is no part of the business of
government to compose official prayers for any group of the American
people to recite as a part of a religious program carried on by government."'4
The opinion was fortified by reflection upon the history of religious oppres-
sion in Europe as well as in the Colonies. It was concluded that our Founding
Fathers "were no more willing to let the content of their prayers and their
privilege of praying whenever they pleased by influenced by the ballot box
than they were to let these vital matters of personal conscience depend
1 Engel v. Vitale, 18 Misc. 2d 659, 191 N.Y.S.2d 453 (Sup. Ct. 1959), aff'd, 11
App. Div. 2d 340, 206 N.Y.S.2d 183 (1960), azff'd, 10 N.Y.2d 174, 176 N.E.2d 579, 218
N.Y.S.2d 659 (1961). The New York courts held that freedom not to participate saved
the prayer constitutionally.
2 Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 424 (1962).
3 Ibid.
4 Id. at 425.
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upon the succession of monarchs."'5 The holding, tersely stated, is that any
government, be it federal or state, is without power to prescribe official
prayers. Seemingly the Court concludes that the concern surrounding the
adopting of the first amendment is good evidence as to the purpose of the
fourteenth in imposing restraint upon the states.
Although the prayer constituted only a slight infringement upon the
constitutional safeguard, the Justices were quick to admonish that, in the
words of James Madison, "It is proper to take alarm at the first experiment
on our liberties."
In another significant judicial footnote, 7 Mr. justice Black, writing
for the majority, made clear that essentially patriotic and ceremonial activities
were not affected. When used for patriotic and ceremonial purposes, reciting
historical documents or songs, singing officially espoused anthems which
include the composer's professions of religions belief, and other manifesta-
tions of God in ceremonial occasions of public life do not fall within this
proscription against government sponsorship of religion. These activities are
not essentially "religious activity." The import of the footnote accords
with the affirmation in the body of the opinion that "The history of man
is inseparable from the history of religion."8
The text of the majority opinion is unusual in that it makes no effort
to garner support from prior cases dealing with the "establishment clause."
There is no reference to the three leading cases either to support the majority
conclusion or to distinguish the present set of facts. Yet on close analysis
it seems that the earlier decisions of Everson v. Board of Education, Mc-
Collum v. Board of Education, and Zorach v. Clausen are not inconsistent
with this latest holding.9
The Everson court, in asserting that payment to parents of parochial
school children to reimburse them for transportation costs was constitutional,
in effect held that where the primary purpose of the government activity
was secular-in that case the safe transportation of school children to and
from a place of education-an incidental religious benefit would not make
the payment unconstitutional. The Engel court, in the tradition of Everson,
5 Id. at 429.
6 Id. at 436.
7 Id. at 435. Footnote 21 to the opinion reads as follows:
There is of course nothing in the decision reached here that is inconsistent with
the fact that school children and others are officially encouraged to express love
for our country by reciting historical documents such as the Declaration of
Independence which contain references to the Deity or by singing officially
espoused anthems which include the composer's professions of faith in a
Supreme Being, or with the fact that there are many manifestations in our
public life of belief in God. Such patriotic or ceremonial occasions bear no
true resemblance to the unquestioned religious exercise that the State of New
York has sponsored in this instance.
8 Id. at 434.
9 Everson v. Bd. of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947); McCollum v. Bd. of Education,
333 U.S. 203 (1948); Zorach v. Clausen, 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
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held that the prayer was strictly a religious activity and that no secular
purpose was served by it, much less a dominant secular purpose. On the
other hand, where the activity challenged has a predominantly patriotic or
ceremonial purpose, the incidental reference of aid to religion will not
invalidate it.10
Mr. Justice Douglas in his concurring opinion defines the issue more
narrowly to be whether the state can finance a religious exercise. He cannot
reconcile Everson. But his major objection lies in the fact that to him any
aid, financial or otherwise, to a religious activity, even though it be incidental,
is a violation of the Constitution. Douglas obviously sees problems now which
did not occur to him in 1947 when he voted with the Everson majority,
or in 1952 when he spoke of the desirability of government respecting "the
religious nature of our people" and accommodating the public service to
their spiritual needs.1
In McCollum v. Board of Education, a local school board allowed
religious teachers employed by private religious groups to come into the
classroom during regular hours to hold classes in religious instruction. The
Court ruled this practice unconstitutional. This was so, even though students
who elected not to take the religious instruction could pursue their secular
studies in another room. Mr. Justice Black, writing for the majority, found that
the school was allowing its compulsory machinery to be used in the fostering
of religion. Even more important, the school building itself, tax-supported,
was being used to aid religious groups in spreading their faith. Black quoted
his earlier opinion in Everson: "There we said: 'Neither a state nor the
Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid
one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another.' ",12
The decision in Zorach was rendered shortly after the McCollum case
was decided. Mr. Justice Douglas wrote the opinion for a majority which
seemed to be softening the requirements set up in the earlier "released time"
case. 13 In New York City, upon parental request, children were allowed to
leave school during regularly scheduled school hours to attend religious
training classes. Those students who did not attend the outside classes
remained in the classroom to study secular subjects. Here, as in McCollum,
the compulsory attendance machinery was working to the benefit of the
religious groups. However, the Court, upholding this method of "released
10 Engel v. Vitale, supra note 2, at 435 (footnote 21).
11 Zorach v. Clausen, supra note 9, at 313.
12 McCollum v. Board, supra note 9, at 210.
13 Serious doubt is now cast upon the status of Zorach as good law. The decision
was 5-4 with Mr. Justice Douglas writing for the majority. Douglas' language in his
concurring opinion in Engel and his majority opinion in Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S.
48S (1961), indicate that the Justice has had an important change of heart. In Torcaso,
in which the Court struck down a Maryland constitutional requirement that a pro-
fession of belief in God is a prerequisite to hold public office, Douglas said (367 U.S.
at 495): "Neither [the State or Federal Government] can constitutionally pass laws
or impose requirements which aid all religions as against non-believers .... "
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time" religious education, distinguished McCollum, saying "this . . . pro-
gram involves neither religious instruction in public school classrooms nor
the expenditure of public funds."'1 4 Disregarding the contention of the
minority that here was the same kind of compulsion as in McCollum, the
Court upheld the New York City regulation and stressed that school build-
ings were not used for religious activity: the school "can close its doors or
suspend its operations as to those who want to repair to their religious
sanctuary for worship or instruction."'15
It may be that as a result of the reaffirmation of the evils of compulsion
in Engel, if the facts of Zorach again reach the Supreme Court, the deci-
sion would be different. With the passage of time, the Court has perhaps
recaptured the courage demonstrated in McCollum. Be that as it may, the
holding in Engel is certainly not in conflict with that in Zorach or McCollum,
and likewise it accords with Everson.
It is interesting to consider here the extent to which the obiter dictum
of Chief Justice Warren in the Sunday Closing Cases' might foreshadow a
change in the approach the Court would take in analyzing the facts of
Zorach. The Chief Justice, following the principle established in Everson,
confirmed that government may adopt laws with secular goals which may
include incidental religious benefits; but these benefits must be necessary
in that the secular goal sought may not be obtained through any reasonable
alternative method. Probably an analysis of Zorach now would be less
inclined to follow the "direct financing" distinction and more likely to look
for a secular purpose being served. From this latter perspective, it is
difficult to conclude that there is any secular purpose in a released time
arrangement to which religious benefit is a necessary and incidental effect.
However, quaere whether the Court is inclined to follow Chief Justice
Warren's dictum in light of the Engel effort to preserve "many manifestations
in our public life of belief in God."'17 It may be that Zorach and this latest
dictum can be rationalized by a new doctrine of "de minimis religious
benefit" of such minor consequence that the Court will pay it no heed. At
any rate, these are grounds for arguing that Warren's Sunday Closing
dictum has been superceded by a more liberal dictum apparent in Engel.
The New York practice failed because it was purely religious activity
on school property. The only benefit being derived was a religious one. The
problem was accentuated by the particularly compelling nature upon children
of the psychological pressures of conformity.
Mr. Justice Stewart, in the lone dissent, expressed fear that the Court
has denied to students who wish to pray the right to do so. The implication
of his dissent is that the right of spontaneous prayer has been denied. A
state-sponsored formula of prayer is a far cry from spontaneous religious
14 Zorach v. Clausen, supra note 9, at 308.
15 Id. at 314.
16 Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 607 (1961).
17 Engle v. Vitale, supra note 2, at 435 (footnote 21).
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supplication. The Court has not said that a group of children by unanimous
vote may not evolve and recite their own prayer, although if done on school
property, it may be questionable.
It is doubtful that Mr. Justice Stewart would urge that a well disci-
plined class routine should be interrupted for the benefit of a few who have
desires, either religious or otherwise, to indulge in some other extracurricular
activity. School is a place for education. Church and home are the place for
religious ritual. When man entered into organized society, he did so at the
expense of sacrificing some of his whims to the will and discipline of the
majority. It does not seem to be an undue restriction on a child's freedom
of religious expression to hold that he may not arise and recite a prayer
each morning after class has convened. On the other hand, it augurs grave
danger, as the Court has indicated, to allow a government and its agents
to formulate and direct exclusively religious ritual.
Mr. Justice Stewart fears for the future of predominantly patriotic
ritual and public ceremonies which make reference to God, suggesting that
a great part of our national heritage must be disavowed as a result of the
majority opinion. "I am at a loss," he explains, "to understand the Court's
• .. [contention that references to God in patriotic ritual] 'bear no true
resemblance to the unquestioned religious exercise that the State of New
York has sponsored in this instance.' "18 Apparently Mr. Justice Stewart
feels no reassurance from the majority's footnote which purports to protect
our public and secular ritual such as the Pledge of Allegiance, opening
of court, singing the National Anthem and endless other patriotic and
ceremonial practices having a predominantly secular benefit to which the
fostering of religion is only incidental. The majority in Zorach v. Clausen,
in dealing with an explanation of when and how the Church and State must
act together, refers to "the common sense of the matter. Otherwise the State
and religion would be aliens to each other .... -19 It is this "common sense
of the matter" to which the Engel majority alludes in footnote 2 1.20
Mr. Justice Stewart does point out one practice which is highly suspect
as a result of Engel. That is the deliverance of prayer is convening the
daily sessions of Congress. Unlike military personnel who might be denied
religious worship if it were not provided on the military installation, Con-
gressmen have their churches and homes freely available. Prayer on the
legislative floor, a distinct supplication as distinguished from the mere
ceremonial adjunct in the opening of a court, may well be a violation of the
Constitution. However, even conceding that several of the traditional
practices cited by the Justice may be theoretically doomed as unnecessary
benefits to religion, it is difficult to conceive how any party could be suffi-
ciently aggrieved to achieve standing to challenge them.2 ' As a practical
18 Id. at 450 (footnote 9 to Mr. justice Stewart's dissent).
19 Zorach v. Clausen, supra note 9, at 312.
20 Engel v. Vitale, supra note 2, at 435 (footnote 21).
21 Kurland, "Of Church and State and the Supreme Court," 29 U. Chi. L. Rev.
1, 17 (1961).
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matter, it is doubtful that the subject of the Justice's grave fears will
become a reality.
It is to be hoped that the Court will stand firm in the face of public
misunderstanding and resistance.2 2 Zorach represented a Court that might
back down in the face of opposition. The tendency might be to distinguish
away Engel if a case arises whereby an individual teacher prescribes a
prayer for his class. True, that would not appear to be as much a fore-
runner of a state church as a state agency recommendation implemented by
local school board action. But for constitutional purposes, the teacher's
action on school property is "state action" and is clearly unconstitutional.
For the future the case seems to forbode no substantial change in the
course that decisions interpreting and applying the "establishment clause"
have been taking 2 3 Engel v. Vitale seems to reaffirm McCollum in all its
rigor after some doubts were cast upon it by Zorach. Although some think
federal aid to parochial schools is doomed by the instant decision, it appears
on close analysis that Engel, like its predecessors, proscribes governmental
activity only in a predominantly religious activity. Education has direct
secular benefits; prayer, according to the Court, has none.
22 Murray v. Curlett, 228 Md. 239, 179 A.2d 698 (1962), cert. granted, 371 U.S.
809 (1962); Abington Township School District v. Schempp, 201 F. Supp. 815 (E.D.
Pa. 1962), probable jurisdiction noted 371 U.S. 807 (1962); Chamberlin v. Dade
County Board of Public Instruction, 143 So. 2d 21 (Fla. 1962).
23 Engel foreshadows affirmation on appeal of Schempp v. School District, supra
note 22. In this case the District Court ruled unconstitutional a state statute which
provided for compulsory reading of the Holy Bible each morning in class as a part of
the opening ceremony, even though upon request any pupil could be excused. The Bible
reading was combined with mass recitation of the Lord's Prayer.
